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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COMING AND GOING RULE ANALYSIS WEIGHS IN FAVOR OF
FINDING SUNDQUIST WITHIN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT
Appellee White Water asserts on appeal that Sundquist was not acting within the

course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident because he was merely
traveling from home to work.1 Relying on the coming and going rule, White Water
argues that the personal nature of Sundquist's trip outweighs any benefit White Water
derived from the trip or any control it exercised over Sundquist's travel. Because White
Water acknowledges that it stood to benefit from the trip—although it does attempt to
minimize the benefits it derived from the trip—it appears that the parties essentially agree
that whether the coming and going rule applies in this case turns on the correct weighing
of the benefits to White Water from the trip and the control it had over the trip verus any
personal benefit the trip had for Sundquist. See Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2002
UT 4,1f 9, 73 P.3d 315 (2003) ("[W]here the employee engages in conduct benefitting the
employer or which is controlled by the employer, we weigh the benefit and control
against the personal nature of the trip in order to determine where it is appropriate to
place liability.").
Appellant Newman does take issue in several respects, however, with White

'White Water does not take issue with the analysis in Newman's opening brief of the facts of this
case under the Birkner criteria for detennining whether an employee's actions fall within the course and
scope of his employment. See generally Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989).

1

Water's benefits analysis and its argument that the personal nature of the Sundquist's trip
to White Water's offices outweighs any benefit to White Water or any control White
Water exercised over Sundquist's conduct. First, in analyzing who was benefitting from
Sundquist's trip to White Water the day of the accident, White Water has incorrectly
included on the scale the personal benefits Sundquist derived from being able to travel
directly home from the job-site at the end of the work day instead of being required to
return the materials to White Water before going home. Any personal benefit Sundquist
gained from his return trip home the night before the accident has no bearing on who was
benefitting from his trip to White Water the next day when the accident occurred. The
benefits of the his trip home the night before would only properly come into play as a
personal benefit if the accident had occurred while Sundquist was traveling to his home
from the job site and the issue to be decided was whether the trip to his home fell within
the course and scope of his employment. With the accident here occurring the following
day during the trip from his home to White Water's offices and the issue being whether
Sundquist was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of that particular
trip, the only benefits that should be considered in the analysis are those that either party
was deriving from that day's travel at the time of the accident and not the benefits from
any other trip not at issue.
Newman also takes issue with White Water's attempts to minimize the benefit it
was receiving from Sundquist's trip the day of the accident by arguing that Sundquist

simply could have returned the materials the night before and that his job responsibilities
did not include transporting the materials to and from his home. White Water does not
explain how the fact that the materials could have been returned the night before or the
fact that White Water allowed Sundquist the leeway of keeping materials with him
overnight at his home and returning them the next day would somehow eliminate or
lessen the benefit that Wliite Water nevertheless gained from having Sundquist return the
materials to headquarters. Just because Sundquist's responsibilities did not technically
including transporting materials to and from his home does not mean that once the
materials are nevertheless transported to White Water that Wliite Water would not benefit
from their return. It is clear that White Water needed to have the materials returned for
later use and that if Sundquist did not transport them back to headquarters, White Water
would have had to send some other employee to retrieve them.
White Water's argument also overlooks the fact that White Water sanctioned, or at
least tacitly approved, Sundquist's practice of returning home with materials following
work on a job rather than requiring him to return the products the same evening. White
Water cannot simply hide behind the fact that it was aware of Sundquist's—and other
installer's—practice of taking materials home and then returning with them to work the
next day and claim that it had no control over the actions or that it did not nevertheless
benefit from the return of its products. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated
Christensen v. Swenson. 874 P.2d 125 (Utah 1994), that it is possible for an employer to

3

tactically sanction or approve employee conduct that would normally fall outside of the
employer's business or be an employee's personal endeavor and have exposure to
vicarious liability for the conduct. I d at 128.
In Christensen, the employer was aware that its employees would occasionally
travel to a restaurant across the street from the workplace during unscheduled breaks to
get food, but the employer had never disciplined the employees for their conduct nor had
it sought to put and end to the practice. Id. In analyzing the Birkner criteria, the
Christensen Court found that there was a question for the jury whether the employer had
tacitly sanctioned or at least contemplated the practice so as to not be able to hide behind
the practice and argue that an employee was on a personal endeavor or outside the scope
of the employer's business when an employee was involved in an accident while making
the trip to the restaurant. I d
The Court's analysis in Christensen is instructive in this case, as it is clear that
White Water was aware of Sundquist's practice of returning home from a job site with
unused materials that he would transport to White Water the next day and that the practice
was not exclusive to Sundquist. White Water had therefore tactically approved or had, at
least, not taken any affirmative steps to put an end to.2 It follows in this case, then, that

2

In his deposition testimony, Mr. Kirk Williamson of White Water was asked "if it's
typical for installers to keep materials in their trucks or trailers overnight at their home" and if
Sundquist's practice for going home directly from a job site and not go back to White Water until
the next morning was typical of installers at the company. Mr. Williamson answered that it
"probably happens" and that practice "would be typical." (Deposition of Mr. Williamson pg. 28,
lines 20-23, pg. 29 lines2 -7).
4
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the dual purpose exception to the coming and going rule comes into play, requiring an
inquiry into the predominant purpose of Sundquist's trip. See Ahlstroiru 2002 UT at ^[14
("If an employee's personal conduct benefits an employer, we have implied that the
employer may be held liable where the predominant purpose of the conduct was not
personal.").
Despite White Water's arguments to the contrary, the fact that Sundquist was
returning materials from the previous day's job to White Water while also traveling to
work to receive new assignments did not just pose a tangential benefit to White Water.
To determine "whether business was the predominant purpose for the trip," the Utah
Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he inquiry is whether the trip is one which would have
required the employer to send another employee over the same route or to perform the
same function if the trip had not been made." IcL White Water again attempts to cloud
the inquiry by asserting that the fact that Sundquist had taken the materials home to be
returned the next day—and the fact that his job duties did not including transporting
materials to his home—somehow eliminates White Water's need to nevertheless have the
products returned. The fact still remains, however, that if Sundquist did not return the
materials when he did, White Water would have been required to send someone else to
retrieve the same materials and travel the same route that Sundquist as traveling at the
time of the accident.
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errand and an accident occurs while the employee is on that detour or errand. See, e.g..
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991). Utah cases have also
recognized, however, that liability reattaches when the employee resumes his employment
after the detour or errand. I d
White Water essentially argues that due to the overnight duration of Sundquist's
deviation from carrying White Water's materials from the job-site to its offices according
to his job duties, liability should not reattach when he is back en route to White Water.
The duration of the detour or personal errand does not necessarily determine whether
liability reattaches once the detour has ended. The inquiry u [i]n situations where
accidents have occurred substantially within the normal spatial boundaries of
employment," as in this case, instead focuses on whether the employee has u return[ed] to
their duties and an accident occurs." Id. at 1042. No case has otherwise placed explicit
time limits on the duration of personal errands or detours.
Here, at the time of the accident, Sundquist had returned to his duty from the
previous day's job to return unused materials to White Water's offices at the time of the
accident. His stopover at home with the materials in his possession was a personal
detour—allowed by White Water—which ended once he began his return trip to White
Water.3

3

The personal detour rule would only preserve White Water from liability in this case had
the accident occurred while Sundquist was traveling to his home the night before. In that
instance, Sundquist's travel would be considered a personal detour or errand during which White
Water would not be liable for his actions. Once Sundquist left his home and returned to the route
8
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he would have been required to travel to return the materials the ilight before—had Wlute Water
insisted on their return rather than allowing him to carry them home first—Sundquist returned to
his duties, ending the detour and once again attaching liability to White Water for his actions.
9

V,

Applicability of AHLSTROM
In addressing Newman's analysis of the applicability of the Ahlstrom case, White

Water asserts that there is no factual support in the record for the assertion that Sundquist
was being paid to transport White Water's materials. White Water asserts that Sundquist
instead was merely paid for the installation of White Water's materials, receiving a
percentage of each job he worked on only for installation and not hauling the product
installed to and from the job site. It is nevertheless undisputed that Sundquist's job
responsibilities specifically included transporting White Water's products to and from job
sites, (R.60,ffl[2 and 3), and that he was paid a percentage of each job he worked on.
Given the undisputed facts—when viewed in the light most favorable to Newman
and all the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom—it goes without saying that
included in the percentage of pay Sundquist received for the installation of White Water's
products was remuneration for transporting the products to the job site. While true, as
White Water points out, that without actual installation there would be no payment, it is
also true that without transportation of the materials there would be no installation. And
as Sundquist was required to haul materials to the job site and install them and then return
any unused products to White Water, it would certainly theoretically not be unthinkable
for White Water to withhold Sundquist's percentage of any job he worked on where he
did not transport unused materials back to White Water from a job-site, at least until such
items were returned, as it was clearly part of his job duties to do so..
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Here, however, there is a clear benefit to White Water from Sundquist5s trip ai llie
time of the accident, distinguishing the present n
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VI.

AT A MINIMUM THERE IS AN ISSUE OF FACT FOR THE
JURY/REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER.
White Water's final argument asserts—as the trial court held—that no reasonable

mind could find that Sundquist was in the course and scope of his employment and that
the question of whether Sundquist was in acting within the scope of his employment was
properly taken from the jury by summary judgment. Given the facts of the case, though,
reasonable minds could certainly differ as to whether at the time of the accident Sundquist
was involved wholly or partly in the perfomiance of White Water's business and whether
the predominant purpose of his trip benefitted Wliite Water and outweighed any personal
benefit to Sundquist. The scope of employment question should not therefore have been
taken from the jury on summary judgment.
Utah case law is clear that the inquiry into "[w]hether an employee is acting within
the scope of her employment is ordinarily a question of fact." IcL Thus, "[t]he question
must be submitted to the jury "'whenever reasonable minds may differ as to whether the
[employee] was at a certain time involved wholly or partly in the performance of [the
employer's] business or within the scope of employment.' " I d (quoting Carter v. Bessey,
97 Utah 427, 432, 93 P.2d 490, 493 (1939)). Consequently, it is only in the clearest of
circumstances that an "employee's activity is so clearly within or outside the scope of
employment that reasonable minds cannot differ, the court may decide the issue as a
matter of law." Id.; Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989);
Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994). For example, an employee's
12
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employment that a trial court could decide the issue as a matter of law. See, e.g., D.D.Z.
v. Molerwav Freight Lines, Inc., 88<« i
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. i

question is pro}
At a minimum, '•»i*-' case prcst.Mi1*- a situation where reasonable minds could clearly
differ as to whether Sundquist was within the course and scope of his employment at the
time of the accident. Summary judgment was incorrectly granted *

wersed.

CONCLUSION
Sundquist was in the course and scope of his employment a I Ilk;
accident, Consequently, Newm;

IIIIH;

ol I be

. anient on tlle issue should

have been graiited. Newman respectfully requests that this court accordingly reverse the
trial court's ruling and enter summary judgment in his favor on the issue.
At a minimum, the issue of whether Sundquist was within the course and scope of
his employment should have been left loi llii nirv l*> do ide as ic.isonaMt tnuul-. i ould
differ <

• issue.

h

,i should the ti lal court have ruled, as a matter of law, that

Sundquist was not in the course and scope of his employment.
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